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irN THE su-PREME COURT
OF THE S1~A_TE OF UTAH
\YF,YHER CONSTRUCTION
CU>IPANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

10307

UTAH STATE ROAD COl\:1l\IISSION,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE MEN'f OF TIIE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by W eyher Construction
Cumpnny, appellant, against the State Road Commis,ion for *15,667.12 extra costs incurred because of the
i11adt<1uaey of the plans and specifications, and for payment of $1,850.00 wrongfully withheld as liquidated
damages.
l

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The trial court held that the plans and specificat' ,
JOn~
were adequate and that the plans were modified and the
extra costs incurred at the instance of "\Veyher, award.
ing judgment in favor of the State Road Conunissio
n.
The lower court awarded judgment in favor of Weyher
in the amount of the $1,850.00 held by the State Road
Commission as alleged liquidated damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The general contractor, "\Veyher, appellant herein.
seeks reversal of the judgment of the trial court in
favor of the Road Commission and against Weyher
on the claim for extra costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Weyher Construction Company, appellant herein,
as general contractor, entered into a contract with the
Utah State Road Commission ,to rebuild a storm drain
running West from Third "\~Test to Fifth West on
Thirteenth South Street. (Exs. 1-P, 2-P). The original
plans and specifications required Weyher to tear out
the existing concrete storm drain, which was 8'6" wide
by 7' high, and to construct a new concrete storm drain
10' wide by 6' high.
The original plans, before modified, required Weyher
to remove the old storm drain, thereafter to f orru for
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tlie new eoncrete drain, aad to pour the concrete in
the forms in the trench. This forming and pouring
uf concrete would have substantially filled the trench

with rnrious construction materials. (R. 59, 60). Thus
the storm water ordinarily coming down the Thirteenth
South storm drain from Parleys, Emigration, and Red
Butte Creeks and the East portion of the city had
'.o be di,~erted around the area of construction while
wnstruction was under way. (R. 236; Ex. 1-P).

Running parallel b the storm drain and about 6
feet South thereof is a 60-inch diameter round concrete
1torm sewer which was constructed in 1952. (Ex. 2-P,
Sl1eets 2, a, 4 and 5). In order to divert the water
around the eonstruction area, the specifications prorided for the use of said 60-inch storm sewer. The particular specification is found on Sheet #JO of the specifications (Ex. 1-P), as follows:

"Special Const ruction Conditions
''The complete construction of this project
shall Le performed only during the months of
August, September or October.
"The Contractor shall divert the flow from
storm drain that is to be removed. This diversion
may be accomplished by means of an existing
cross eonnection to a parallel 60-inch storm drain
in the vicinity of First 'Vest Street. The diversion shall be. removed upon completion of this
project.
"Separate parment will not be made for constructing and removing the diversion. The cost
thereof shall be included in other items of work."

.3

Generally, Weyher claims in the law suit that :t
was entitled to rely on the use of said 60-inch star
sewer in diverting the storm waters around the co~
struction project and that since the 60-inch drain wai
inadequate to handle the water, the plans and spec].
fl.cations were, therefore, inadequate. (Pre-trial Order
R. 19).
'
The Road Commission generally claims that the
specifications do not constitute a representation as to
the adequacy of the 60-inch line to handle the storm
water and that, therefore, the specifications are not
defective. (R. 19, 20).
Shortly after the project began, 'Veyher constructed
the required diversion dam to divert water around the
project and down the 60-inch storm sewer. (R. 62-68).
(See Exhibit 7-P, showing relative locations of the 60·
inch line, the storm drain under construction, and the
diversion dam). The 60-inch line was inadequate, how·
ever, and would not accommodate all of the water com·
ing down the storm drain. The dam broke, sending
water down the storm drain. (R. 62-68, 119-121).
Thereafter, on several occasions, the dam either broke
or had to be lowered in order to prevent water backing
up to the East, and such breaking or lowering per·
mitted the water to flow through the construction area
of the storm drain, all because of the inability of the
60-inch storm sewer to carry the water. (R. 63, 69.
92, 119-121, 136, 137).

When the dam held, water backed up into businesses
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strePt areas East of the project. When the
broke or was lowered water coursed down the
strudion area with great force sufficient at one
to move a Caterpillar tractor several feet. (R. 92,
aiid

dam
contime
119-

121).

\fter the first flooding and dam breaking, a conferen<:e was held with the Road Commission and its
representatives to attempt to solve the problem. (R.
rt 283-286) . 'V eyher suggested some solutions in these
conferenees, as did the Road Commission. (R. 72,
rn7-l:i9). (Ex. 5-P). The Road Commission's suggesr;ous were deemed impractical and too costly for reasonable consideration. (R. 137-138). The Road Commission, pursuant to a suggestion of Weyher, prepared
preliminary sketches for a change in the design of the
construction of the storm drain. (Ex. 8-P) . This preliminary sketch was delivered to W eyher September 5,
Wol. (Ex. 5-P, letter dated September 7, 1961). The
final modified plans (Ex. 6-P) were delivered to W eyher
1111 or about October 11, 1961. (R. 82).
1

The modified plans provided for prefabrication of
the sides and top of the storm drain at an off-jobsite
location. The modified plans thus eliminated construction of the formwork and pouring of concrete down
:11 the trench. The modified plans permitted the job
to pruceed without placing the construction material
in lhr: trench in jeopardy of being washed down the
rlrain wherever the 60" drain was inadequate. (R. 78,
i,i-88, 276-281).

5

The modified plans required a wider trench arirl
different.construction metho~s. (Ex. 6-P (R. 162, 10 ~
31
The proJect thereupon contmued to completion under
the modified plans. The parties sent letters back and
forth, each maintaining its respective legal position
regarding the adequacy of the plans. (Ex. 5-P).
\Veyher was thus able to proceed notwithstanding
the fact that the 60-inch line was inadequate, whereas
without the modified plans, the project could not hare
proceeded without extreme risk and extensive delai
and extra cost greatly in excess of the actual cosis
incurred. (R. 100-102, 276-281).
Weyher, in proceeding with the work under tbe
modified plans, incurred additional costs of $15,667.12,
which it would not have incurred under the original
plans-had they been adequate. (Ex. 4-P) (R. 39, 40,
85). The Road Commission stipulated to these costs
and their reasonableness. ( R. 85) . The Road Commis·
sion, however, denied liability for these costs (R. 40)
and maintained that the plans and specifications were
adequate and that the change was merely for the con·
venience of Weyher and at its request. (Ex. 5-P). The
trial court upheld the Road Commission in this inter·
pretation of the contract. (R. 27, 28).

If the 60-inch drain had been adequate, 'Veyher
would not have incurred the costs which are subject
of this law suit because the water would have been
adequately diverted around the project site without
further complication. (R. 88).

6
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The rain which caused the flow of water down the
l, 110 1 drain fluring the period in question was causccl
11 the usual summer thunder showers to be expected
11; Jhe area, according to the weather reports for the
pail years Hl55-1961. (Exs. Hi-P and 17-P) (R. 268·;7.J:. 'fbe trial court made no finding or conclusion
on the extent of these rains. These exhibits are the only
competent evidence in this regard.
1

The Road Commission withheld $1,850.00 as liqui1l:iterl damages because the project was not completed
1111tlme. (H.182) (Ex. 13-DJ. The delay_forwhich
.1aid damages were withheld occurred during the period
i1ehreen the state's preparation of the preliminary
•ketcli and delivery of the amended plans. The lower
court g<ffe judgment, directing that the liquidated
rlamages he released and paid to 'Veyher.

ARGU~IENT

I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR
THR CONSTRUCTION OF THE STORM
DRAIN 'VERE ADEQUATE.
A. THE PLANS 1\.ND SPECIFICATIONS
WERE UNQUALIFIED REPRESENTA-

TIONS OF TIIE ADEQUACY OF THE 60"
DRAIN.
7

l
The specification involved is:

"Special Construction C onditiorn
"The complete construction of this proj t
shall be performed only during the months e~f
August, September or October.
"The C:ontrac~or shall divert the flow from
storm dram that is to be removed. This diversion
may be accomplished by means of an existing
cross connection to a parallel 60-inch storm drain
in the vicinity of First West Street. The diversion shall be removed upon completion of this
project.
"Separate payment will not be made for constructing and removing the diversion. The cost
thereof shall be included in other items of work."
W eyher was entitled to rely upon this specification
as providing a means of diverting the water around
the project. The specifiction requires the Contractor
to divert the water around the storm drain. Attention
is directed to the wording, "The Contractor shall divert
the flow ... ". Thus under the specifications, the Con·
tractor had no alternative but to divert the water
around the construction (R. 137). This did not con·
template running the water through the construction,
either in a free flow or in any type of flume or pipe.
It clearly requires the water to be diverted around the
storm drain, and necessarily so because the construction,
including forming and pouring, was to be right in the
trench. (R. 59, 60).
The second sentence of the specification is: "This

8
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I

n-;i(Ju may be accomplished by means of an existing
,ru~s connection to a parallel 60-inch storm drain in
:!w 1 iciuity of First \Yest Street." This sentence, thereiin~. offers to the Contractor a means of accomplish1w the absolute requirement evidenced in the first
1rntem·c by the words '\hall diYert". This second senlenre 111 no way indicates that the 60-inch drain may
,111lr be partly adequate, but rather indicates clearly
iliat 1his is a method of accomplishing the required
l'.ersion. (ll. 137). The Contractor, \Veyher, was
111titled to rely upon the adequacy of the 60-inch storm
1lrain as a means of accomplishing the diversion. At
rnrli time as the 60-iueh storm drain proved itself
:11:1de(1uatc to handle the water, this specification became
111adeq ua te and required a modification.
; ; ••

1

.~

Xeither the subject specification nor any of the
11thrr speeifications in any way indicate that the 60indi drain eould or should be used in connection with
1ther means to accomplish the required diversion. The
1
Co11traetor was permitted to use this 60-inch drain if
:'r eleded to do so and thus this permission constitutes
'11 offer or representation by the Owner that the 60i11d1 drain was adequate. It would be strange indeed
111 C'ontend that this representation did not mean what
itsars and that it did not indicate that the 60-inch drain
•:1111hl accomplish the diYersion. To the contrary, the
rtpre~rntation is clear that the di1·ersion could be accomrlislwd by means of the HO-inch drain. If the state had
:Iii) rJtJirr intent, it should haYC SO specified.
1

In addition to the specifications, the Contr'<IC tIJr II
must, and did, rely upon the contract plans. (Ex. 2.p 1
Sheets 1 through 4 of the plans all show the locatiun
of the 60-inch drain. Sheet 5 shows the cross-sectioii
of the 60-inch drain. There is no cautionary langua t
on these plans in any way warning the Contractor tl~l
the 60-inch drain is inadequate to carry the flow. N0.
where in the specifications is the Special Constructi 011
Condition on Sheet 10 qualified or in any way modified
by any restrictive language. There is no conflict between the specifications and the plans. There can ht
no question but that the specifications represent tha1
the water must be diverted and can be diverted through
the 60-inch drain.
The specification in question is on Page IO of the
Special Provisions of the contract, and is designated
as a "Special Construction Condition." Obviously the
very purpose of a Special Construction Condition is
to cover a particular construction problem with specific
instructions. These specific instructions must as a matter
of law be given precedence over the General Construc·
tion Provisions in the contract. Erickson v. United
States, 107 Fed. 204, 9th Cir.; and Hollerbach v. United
States, 233 U.S. 165.
The handling of the water was a special problem,
requiring a special construction specification. This
special specification prescribed the particular months
during which construction would be undertaken in order
to take advantage of the lesser amount of storm water
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he diYerted. This speeification absolutely required
the \\ ater to be diYerted around the construction area.
The spe(·ification also established a means for diverting
the water, designating the location of the diverting
darn as being two blocks East of the project. The
spedieation further required the Contractor to include
tlie r·ust of constructing said diYersion dam in his costs
for other work on the project. Everything points to
:i definite specification relating to the manner of construdion.
111

E,·en the Architect-Engineer for ·the State, in a
Jetter preceding the preparation of the plans and specilications, on .March 19, 1959, gave this water matter
speeial recognition. In this letter, he recommended to
tlie State that the work be a~omplished during the
mot1ths of .July, August, and September and further
stated that:
"During those three months, it is our understanding that the flow in the storm drain can be
<liYerted to the 60-inch storm sewer which is also
in Thirteenth South Street." (Exhibit 14-P,
Il. 248-250). (See also Ex. 15-D).

!

A representation in the specifications by the Owner
can as a matter of law be relied upon by the Contractor.
This speciiieation relates to the means of performing
the work and is essential to the completion of the
project. Such a representation, therefore, impliedly,
if nol expressly, warrants the sufficiency of the matters
represented in the specification. Should this sufficiency
he inadequate, then it necessarily follows that the express

11

or implied warranty is breached. See Montrose Contr
,
arr
.
1
ing Company v. County of w estchester, 2d Cir. 80 r \'IC
2d 841, Certiorari Denied, 298 U.S. 662; Railroaa · ('W
Water Proofing Corporation v. United States, 137 F.
ab
Supp. 713; and, Atlantic Dredging Company v. Unitea
re
States, 253 U.S. 1.

\h
SI
th
pl
cl
d

The State, during the trial, contended that the
word "may" in the second sentence of the second para.
graph of said Special Construction Condition, pre·
eluded the Contractor from relying absolutely upon
the 60-inch storm drain, and further argued that this
word merely permitted the Contractor to use the 60· ol
inch drain without representation as to its carrying
capacity. Appellant submits that this argument is obvi·
fi
ously contrary to the overall intent of the specification
and is further unsupported by law. To the contrary,
the courts hold that even though a method is made
available to the Contractor, thus permitting him to
undertake other alternates, he is entitled to rely upon
the adequacy of the stated method set forth in the specifications. In F. H. McGraw v. United States, 82 Fed.
Supp. 338, the specifications provided that a temporary
electric power source would be available at no cost to
the Contractor in the immediate vicinity of the con·
templated work. Admittedly, the Contractor was not
required to use that source of electricity. As a factual
matter, the power was not available in the immediate
vicinity, and the Court, in discussing this specification,
held that this was a representation upon which the Con·
tractor was required to rely. Again, in Johnson v,
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States, 153 Fed. 2d. 846, the specifications prorided that gravel for crushing was available. In that
('nift'd

case. the Contractor was entitled to rely upon the availability of the gravel even though there w~s no specific
representation indicating the quantity nor requiring
the Contractor to use that available source. In United
States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, the Court held that
the responsibility of the Owner to furnish adequate
plans and specifications is not overcome by the usual
clauses requiring the Contractor to visit the site, to
check the plans, and to inform itself of the requirements
of the work. Arcole vs. U.S., 125 Ct. Cls. 818.
It is apparent, therefore, that the plans and speci!ications unqualifiedly represented the 60-inch drain
as an adequate means of diverting the water.

B. THE CONTRACTOR 'VAS ENTITLED TO
RELY UPON THE SPECIFICATIONS.

'V eyher was entitled to rely upon the representation that the 60-inch drain was adequate to accommodate
the diversion of water. Christie v. United States, 237
U.S. 234; and, MacArthur Bros. v. United States, 258

r.s. 6.

Admittedly, under the specifications, Weyher was
obligated to examine the job site, and this he did. (R.
j7, 90, 91, 108, 109, 115). He observed and inspected
lhe condition of the existing line, the condition of the
nO-inch drain, and the location of the diversion dam,
together with many other factors, of course. This exam-
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ination, however, in no way could have put him 011 ,
'<Ill\
notice that the 60-inch drain was inadequate to handl.c
the divt;rsion of the water. The Contractor is nol J'P
quired to question the design or the accuracy of specifications in his inspection of the job site. In Ilollerbuch
supra, the Supreme Court said: "In its positiYe assertion of the nature of this much of the work it made a
representation upon ·which the claimants had a right
to rely without an investigation to prove its falsity··
The inspection of a job site relates to matters whieh
are not covered by specific representations in the plan1
and specifications. In this case, the Contrador certainly was entitled to assume that son~e i1westigatin 11
had been made by the State prior to inclwling thf
specification permitting the 60-inch drain to be useJ
to divert the water. This investigation would not be
reasonable for 'V eyher to make in the face of ll
specification which represents that the drain would
handle the diversion. In other words, there was 11otl1ing
to put 'Veyher on notice that the drain was inadequate.
The responsibility for the aecuracy of the plam
and specifications rests with the State as the party pre·
paring and furnishing said plans and specifications.
The Contractor is never obligated to check for defeds
in the design criteria employed by the Owner in tlic
preparation of the plans and specifications. The Con·
tractor has a short period of time within which to bid
a project. The State has many months or e\·en years
of engineering investigation which precedes the final
preparation of plans and specifications.

1-4

l' THE

GO-INCII DRAIN WAS INADEQCA'l'E AS A :MEANS OF DIVERSION.

On !'ieventl occasions when the storm drain water
11 as diverted into the 60-inch drain by the diversion
1Jums the 60-inch drain would not handle the water.
iR. o2-H8, 119-121). In one instance, in order to precent barking-up of the water East of the project, it
11 as necessary to remove part of the dam and let the
1rater flow down the construction site. (R. 62-63).
The very purpose of the storm drain and the reason
it is designated as such obviously is to handle the storms
1\1ntributing to the run-off from the Eastern portion
of the city down the Thirteenth South drain and into
the Jordan River. In its specification, the State required the project to be performed during August,
September or October. It was reasonable to expect
that the State's architects and engineers were familiar
, with the types of storms which would reasonably be
I expected during these months. In making provision
\ for the diversion of this flow, the State could be expected
to prescribe a means of accomplishing the diversion
which would work. Although the Road Commission
, witnesses testified that the 60-inch drain was intended
: to accomplish the diversion only if the water was not
111gmented by any s torms, such an argument seems
to hare little merit. If the specification is to have any
meaniug at all, it must have been intended to provide
~ "means for diverting the storms reasonably expected
I
i ,\11ring August, September and October. The 60-inch
I
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drain did not meet these expectations and thus' tlie '''l)tl'I
fication was inadequate.
.
In any event, the evidence shows without contr:idiction that there were no unusual storms during the
construction period. 'V eyher introduced the Daily Precipitation Records of the
eather Bureau for August.
September and October of the years 1955 through 1%1.
(Ex. 16-P). From the Daily Precipitation Records ,
'Veyher prepared a summary to show that during these
three months in past years, a pattern of summer storms
developed and could reasonably have been expected
in 1961. Exhibit 17-P shows the rain fall percentages
of I-inch. For example, in August of 1957, there 1ras
rain fall of 72 hundredths of an inch at .Mountain Dell
and 22 hundredths of an inch at the University; in
1959, there were four separate summer storms; in 1960,
there was one storm; and, in 1961, there were three
storms. The same comparison can be made for the other
months of September and October, showing that during
this period of the year, it is reasonable to anticipate
summer storms. A summer storm is not, therefore. an
unusual flooding condition which would not be coYered
by the specification in question. The trial court igwired
the problem, making no finding or conclusion thereon.

"T

I

II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING TI-UT
THERE WAS NO ThIISREPRESENT,\TJOX
IN THE PLANS AND SPECIFICA TJOXS

16

JND THAT THE PARTIES HAD EQUAL

KN<HVLEDGE OF THE CONDITIONS.

This holding is immaterial in any attempt to relieve
the State from the responsibility of preparation of the
plans and specifications. The Road Commission has the
~bligation in preparing plans and specifications, to
adequately investigate the construction conditions and
to aceurately represent to the Contractor the construction requirements as well as design factors in order
that the Contractor. can with confidence rely on said
plans and specifications. The Contractor admittedly
!1as the .obligation of inspecting the project site and
this was done by ,\Veyher. However, W eyher is no1
required to attempt to determine whether or not there
are errors in the specifications, nor is Weyher required
to change, modify or question the design responsibility
of the Owner. See Guyler v. United States, 314 F2d
i06 (1963); and United States v. Utah N. & C. Stage
Co., 199 U.S. 414, 424, wherein the Court states:
"The obligation to examine the site did not
impose upon him (contractor) the duty of making a diligent inquiry into the history of the
locality with a view to determining at his peril
whether the sewer specifically prescribed by the
Government would prove adequate ... "
Obviously, the Road Commission in this case could
reasonably be expected to provide a specification
r·apable of performance. The preliminary investigation necessary to make this specification would be
no different from the preliminary engineering work
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required before preparation of technical portions of
the plans and specifications. In either event, the de.
sign responsibility and the accuracy responsibilitv
are placed upon the Owner as the party preparing an.ii
guaranteeing these plans and specifications. Any ambiguity, of course, is construed against the party preparing
the plans and specifications. This design responsibility is
not eliminated under a theory that the Contractor has
the same means to gain the background knowledge as
does the Owner. Although the Contractor may han had
means to undertake the cross-sectioning of the 60-inch
drain, to ascertain the quantity of water which the <lraiu
would hold, to compute the quantity of water which
might come down in any particular storm, or to do any
other engineering investigation, the law does not place
upon the Contractor the legal obligation to do this work
The Contractor has neither the time nor facilities to
do this in the preparation of his bid. The Contractor
is required to notify the Owner of any apparent dis·
crepancies in the plans and specifications, but in no
way is it required to undertake a check of the Owner's
design factors. Spearin v. United States, supra; llol·
lerbach v. United States, supra.
Therefore, the holding that the Contractor had
the same knowledge or the means to gain the same
knowledge as the State is meaningless under construe·
tion law principles. Furthermore, such a holding is so
general that it has little, if any meaning in this ca1P.
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III.

I THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE CHANGE IN THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS 'VAS REQUESTED BY WEYHER.
About August 14 ,1961, when the first diversion
dam was washed out, Mr. Kennelly, State's Resident
Engineer, was contacted and the problem of the inadequacy was presented to him. He thereafter, at a meeting
with Jack Skewes, Chief Construction Engineer, Mr.
Kennelly and representatives of the Contractor, discussed the problem of the 60-inch drain. (R. 65). At
this time, the State agreed that the water could not
go down the project if construction was to proceed.
The State suggested two alternatives: (a) Constructing
alarge pipeline to run down the trench to carry the
irater and to work around this pipeline; and, (b) to
construct a ditch to the North of the project down
which the water could be diverted. These two alternatires were deemed impractical, as being too expensive
and also contrary to the regulations of Salt Lake City.
(R. 137-139). Weyher also suggested an alternative
which involved prefabrication of the sides and top of
1
l the storm drain at a fabrication point off the job site.
This suggestion was accepted by the State and preliminary plans were drawn by the State's engineer, Mr.
Sargent, at the direction of Mr. Skewes. (R. 139 (Ex.
8-P and 5-P).
Following this first conference and continuing
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throughout the course of the contract, various letter\
were ·written back and forth between the parties, wherein
the problem was fully discussed. The Contractor ;11
essence directed the State's attention to the prohlein,
denied responsibility for the design and requested a
change order be issued to remedy the impossible situ.
ation. The State, in these letters, essentially directed
'V eyher to proceed and denied responsibility upon tlie ,
theory that the plans were adequate and that any deli
ation therefrom would be at 'Veyher's election. The
pertinent letters are listed below in substance to shO\i
that Weyher did not voluntarily assume the costs of
the inadequate specifications, but rather was required
to proceed in the face of impossible specifications:

!

(a) Weyher's letter of August 18, HHil, indi·
eating that the plans were inadequate, suggesting
the possibilities for curing the problem, and requesting information on how to proceed.
(b) The State's memorandum of August 2j,
1961, denying the specifications were inadequate
and completely ignoring the problem.
(c) The August 31, 1961 letter from \Veyher's
attorney, again indicating the inadequacy of the
specifications, the Contractor's proceeding under
protest, and the fact that 'Veyher could not assurnt
design responsibility.
( d) The September 7, 1961 letter from Wey·
her to the State, referring to the preliminary skctcli
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of the engineer and further referring to prior correspondence as a condition of further procedure.
(e) The September 12, 1961 letter from the
State, indicating that Weyher is to proceed provided that no conflict with the plans would result.
Obviously, vV eyher could not proceed under the
existing plans without conflicting therewith, and
just as obviously, the State, in approving the preliminary sketches a week earlier, had recognized
this problem.
(f) The September 18, 1961 letter from \Veyher to the State, stating that the State is responsible for the extra costs to be incurred, is responsible for the redesign of the storm sewer under
the supplemental plans, requesting an extension
of time, and estimating that the extra cost would
exceed $12,000.00.
(g) The memorandum of September 19,' 1961,
in which the State discusses the right of Mr. \Veyher to proceed at his own election. Obviously,
this election is meaningless, in that it was impossible to proceed under the original specifications.
(h) The September 19, 1961 letter from the
State to \Veyher, denying responsibility for increased costs, but permitting a claim for additional
eosts to be submitted in the future.
(i) The September 21, 1961 letter from \Veyher, indicating that it would proceed, but would
submit claims for additional costs.
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(j) The October 6, 1961 letters to anfl t· rorn
VVeyher, relating to the fact that the amender!
plans had not been received.
From these letters and from the testimo 11 •,, con.
cerning the meetings between the parties, it is appareni
that both the State and 'Veyher were each asserhli~
their respective claims or defenses and were agreein~
that the matter could be resolved in the future. It~
apparent that the inadequacy of the 60-inch drain posed
an impossible situation upon the Contractor. The Statt
suggested remedies, as did YVeyher, and the most expe·
dient, reasonable and practical method was adopted.
The State now seeks to evade responsibility upon the
theory that since 'V eyher made the suggestion which
was finally accepted, that 'Veyher was a volunteer and
had assumed all costs incurred in remedying the prob·
lem. It is evident that 'Veyher followed the contract
procedures of notifying the State of the problem, sug·
gesting remedies, asking for a change order and ind!·
eating an estimate of the increased costs, all prior to
any action on the part of the State or 'Veyher. The
State cannot refuse to issue a change order, but at
the same time agree to a means of remedying inadequate
specifications on the pretext that any action under·
taken by the Contractor is voluntary. The State super·
ficially and without just cause, refused to assume ill
obligation under the contract of ordering a change
therein. This refusal is just as superficial as was the
State's tenacious holding to the very end that 'Veyher
was in default in the time requirements and would haYe
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! 10 be

assessed liquidated damages. On October 30,
1961. the State completely ignored the fact that it had
failed to proYide W eyher with the amended plans from
September 5, 1961, and in said letter, assessed Weyher
with liquidated damages for this entire period. (Ex.
1
5-P) (R. 174, 175, 195, 206).
The inadequate plans cannot be remedied by a claim
against the Contractor that he is voluntarily assuming
the costs of performing according to amended plans
authorized by the State. The fact remains that the
Contractor actually performed the work at an admitted
increased cost and pursuant to the change in the ·plans
and specifications approved by the State because said
plans had to be amended in order to prove workable.
The State seeks refuge behind a technicality, which in
fact does not exist.

SUMMARY
The representation that the 60-inch line would
rnrry the diverted water was erroneous. The Contractor
my obviously bid the project in reliance upon said
!pecification. Had it been able to perform in accordance
therewith, it would not have incurred the additional
rnsts of $15,667.12. The inadequacy of the 60-inch
urain specification caused an impossible construction
iituation. It also caused a dangerous as well as costly
tloo<ling situation to the East of the project. The
~tate in effect required the Contractor to proceed to
ture said discrepancies and, in so doing, the Contractor
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incurred the additional costs. The flooding was el'1m1.·
nated and the construction was completed in them OS t
reasonable and practical as well as timely method pos.
sible. The State, in fomenting a confused and imprac.
tical situation, should bear the reasonable cost resultinri
from its inadequa.ite specifications.
b
The State should have known of the capabilities
of the 60-inch drain, and in requiring the contract to
be performed during the summer months, should hare
made adequate provision, since this was its apparent
intent, for the handling of the waters ordinarily expected
during the summer storms. As a. matter of fact, the
drain would not handle these ordinary summer storms
and the Contractor, to cure this problem, was required
to incur the additional costs. Either on a change order
basis, on a damages theory, or upon the theory of quan·
tum meruit, whereby the State has received the admitted
and reasonable benefits of the Contractor's work, the
Contractor should not now be required to bear the finan·
cial burden of the State's incompetent specifications.
The judgment of the lower court should be re·
versed and judgment granted for the agreed and rea·
sonable costs of $15,667.12.
Respectfully submitted,
Elliott Lee Pratt, Esq.
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
Attorneys for Appellant
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